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THE END OF CITIZENSHIP?
Jonathan Weinberg*
BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AFrER GLOBALIZATION. By
Peter J. Spiro. New York: Oxford University Press. 2008. Pp. 194. $29.95.
INTRODUCTION
In Beyond Citizenship: American Identity After Globalization,
Peter J. Spiro' surveys "the lines that mark the boundaries of the human
community, the lines that divide Americans from others" (p. 3). Spiro con-
ducts this inquiry through the lens of citizenship law: Who is born an
American citizen? Who can become one? To what extent can one be a citi-
zen both of the United States and of another country? What legal benefits
does American citizenship actually confer, and what obligations does it im-
pose? The answers to these questions, he urges, will tell us who is an
American, and armed with that understanding, we can better answer the
question of "what it means to be an American" (p. 4; emphasis added).
Spiro's answers are sobering. Because of the pressures of globalization,
he concludes, the rules governing who is an American citizen have become
hopelessly disconnected from any reasonable conception of who ought to be
one. What's more, they are necessarily disconnected: there is no way to re-
cast American citizenship law so that it corresponds to any meaningful
understanding of the bounds of American community.
The costs of this disjunction, Spiro continues, are high. The absence of
any sensible borders to the American community means that we are less
likely to feel bonds of loyalty to other citizens simply by virtue of their be-
ing citizens. This undercuts our sense that we are all organically connected,
part of a shared community. The result is that we are less willing to sacrifice
on behalf of our fellow citizens and the community at large.
At the heart of Spiro's book is a claim that American citizenship is los-
ing its worth and indeed its meaning in a globalizing world. As the
boundaries of the national community have blurred, Spiro tells us, citizen-
ship itself has become less valuable. Fewer aliens living in the United States
are electing to become U.S. citizens (pp. 56-58). And, he continues, why
should they? Citizenship offers little in the way of tangible benefits, just as
it demands little in the way of civic responsibility (Chapter Four). Changes
in the law of plural citizenship, making it easy for a person to be a citizen of
several countries at once, have undercut citizenship's significance (Chapter
Three).
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Moreover, Spiro writes, in a world in which most of the global popula-
tion shares American values and culture, there is little to distinguish
members of the American community from outsiders. It is becoming in-
creasingly incoherent to think of the United States as a "self-contained
nation"-an entity with a sharp distinction between members and nonmem-
bers, essentially different from other organizations, with a unique claim to
its members' allegiance. Rather, we are moving toward a post-globalization
world in which the state will only be one membership organization among
many (Chapters Five and Six). Citizenship, he concludes, is in irreversible
decline.
This is an important book, essential reading for anyone seriously con-
cemed with the nature of citizenship: Spiro raises crucial questions about
the nature of American identity in the modem age. Historically, it was
American civic culture-incorporating such elements as commitments to
liberty, equality, individualism, and tolerance of diversity-that was said to
set Americans apart from the rest of the world and form the basis of Ameri-
can national identity.2 When that civic creed has become so successful as to
be adopted across the globe, though, what differentiates those of us inside
the American citizenship wall from those without?
Spiro, I think, draws too sharp a line between modem globalization and
the world of the past. Part I of this Review challenges his view that the value
of American citizenship is in decline. Part II critiques his discussion of the
lines drawn by citizenship law-who is or can become a citizen-and what
those lines mean for the nature of citizenship in the modem age. This Part
urges that the lack of fit between our citizenship rules and the goal of or-
ganic community is hardly new; it was a feature of our citizenship law long
before current globalization trends. Part III discusses the meaning of citizen-
ship, and the basis for citizenship and immigration exclusions, in the context
of contemporary thinking about citizenship and nationhood. It urges that the
theoretical incoherence Spiro sees in the foundations of modem citizenship
was also present before globalization and suggests that we can best address
citizenship's challenges by opening our borders broadly to people who want
to become part of the American experiment.
I. THE VALUE OF CITIZENSHIP
In support of his thesis that U.S. citizenship is in decline, Spiro puts for-
ward the argument that as a practical matter being a U.S. citizen is not very
meaningful. Citizenship gets you little in the way of rights and demands
little in the way of obligations. Aliens living legally in the United States, in
increasing numbers, are not bothering to become citizens. U.S. law over the
years has relaxed the requirements for naturalization; that, Spiro urges, re-
flects the fact that "[c]itizenship no longer presents a seller's market"
2. See KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CON-
STITUTION (1989).
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(p. 36). On the contrary, "the long-term value added in citizenship is rela-
tively insignificant" (p. 91).
At first glance, this argument seems odd. Across the world, there are
millions of people who want to come to the United States to live and can't
do so because U.S. immigration rules forbid it. Those who live in Mexico,
say, may be able to cross the land border in secret and live here illegally.
Those who live in the Philippines, on the other hand, will not even be able to
do that; the typical poor Filipino cannot get even a tourist visa to visit the
United States.3 If these people were U.S. citizens, their right to live here
would be unchallengeable. The ability to enter and live in the United States
is a hugely important perk of citizenship that many people would give a
great deal for.
Spiro, of course, doesn't deny this. Rather, he explains, the right to enter
and live in the United States can be separated from U.S. citizenship (Chap-
ter Four). U.S. law recognizes the status of lawful permanent resident (or
"green card" holder); such a person has the legal right to live in the United
States but doesn't have the status of citizen. Spiro is willing to concede that
green cards are valuable: "[i]f there were a global auction for immigrant
visas, they would command a substantial price" (p. 91). But, he continues,
"citizenship is another story. As a product, it has almost gone begging for
customers. 4
A. The Illusion of Declining Naturalization Rates
Unlike Spiro, I am not sure that we can so easily separate lawful perma-
nent resident status from citizenship for the simple reason that American law
has not much separated them. In order to become a U.S. citizen, one must
first become a lawful permanent resident; once one becomes a lawful per-
manent resident, the road to citizenship is straightforward! U.S. law
historically viewed lawful permanent residents as what Hiroshi Motomura• . . ,,6
has called "Americans in waiting. There is no such thing as a U.S. immi-
grant visa that does not carry with it the promise of citizenship, and there is
no prospect that U.S. law will create one.
3. See Vanessa S. Barcelona, How To Maximize Your Chances Of Obtaining a B2 Tourist
Visa, BASTA PINOY NEWS, Oct. 1999, http://www.bastapinoy.com/immig9O.htm.
4. P. 91. Spiro suggests that even undocumented aliens have little to gain from citizenship,
because they can often secure work and participate in civil society notwithstanding their illegal
status. Pp. 90-91. This is hard to take seriously but not necessary to his larger argument.
5. One shouldn't take it for granted, though. Between 1996 and today, the U.S. government
has denied from 12% to over 30% of all naturalization petitions. Julia Preston, Perfectly Legal Immi-
grants, Until They Applied for Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2008, at Al. That's a change: from
the 1930s through 1990, it denied fewer than 5%. Id. This reflects either sharply increased interest
by aliens in becoming citizens, leading to a larger proportion of marginal applications; tougher
standards on the part of U.S. government evaluators; or both. See id.
6. HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 123 (2006).
7. Immigrant visas are different from temporary visas, such as tourist visas, which do not
create a path to citizenship. Some immigration reform proposals would grant temporary visas to
April 20091
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At the same time, Spiro is correct that it would tell us something impor-
tant if lawful immigrants to the United States increasingly chose to live out
their lives as noncitizens. That would indicate that people in a position to
make the choice today do not especially value membership in the U.S. citi-
zenry-that they want to live in America but not to become Americans.
But is it true? The facts don't bear it out. There is no reason to believe
that immigrants today value citizenship less than participants in past waves
of immigration did, and there is substantial reason to believe they value it
more.
Here's a starting point: Every year since 1993 has seen a larger number
of petitions for naturalization filed than any year before 1993. In all of U.S.
history from 1789 through 1992, no more that 342,000 petitions for natu-
ralization were filed in a given year. In the fourteen years from 1993 through
2006, the number of naturalization petitions filed each year has ranged be-
tween 461,000 and 1,413,000.8
That statistic doesn't resolve the issue. Numbers of naturalization peti-
tions don't tell us too much about the rate at which aliens are applying for
citizenship; presumably there are more applications now because there are
more aliens living in the United States who are in a position to apply. Spiro
writes that "the proportion of foreign-born residents who naturalize has been
steadily decreasing, from 63.6 percent in 1970 to 37.4 percent in 2000" (p.
58). Adjusting Spiro's figures to exclude from the calculation aliens who are
here illegally or otherwise are not legally eligible to naturalize, 59% of eli-
gible aliens today are citizens. That figure does seem somewhat low; it has
been higher at various points in U.S. history. Does it show that citizenship in
the United States is currently going begging? Actually, it does not.
Immigrants are more likely to have naturalized the longer they have
lived here. The citizen component of the immigrant population is highest in
times of low immigration, when much of the nation's immigrant population
entered long before; it is lowest after immigration surges, when more immi-
grants have recently arrived."' In 1920, thus, the country had just seen a
major wave of immigration; moreover, the newest immigrants were poorer,
less educated, and slower to naturalize than those who had come before."
The result: only 49% of the country's legal immigrants were naturalized in
Mexican guest workers; because their visas would be only temporary, those workers would have no
right to stay in the country long-term and no promise of citizenship. See, e.g., Comprehensive Im-
migration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1348, 110th Cong. § 402 (2007).
8. See Office of Immigration Statistics, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2006 YEARBOOK
OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 51-52 tbl.20 (2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrarylassetsl
statistics/yearbook/2006/OIS_2006_Yearbook.pdf. The number of naturalization petitions peaked in
1997, largely in response to the bulge of applicants who gained permanent residence after the en-
actment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. The 2006 figure was 730,642. Id.
9. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., GROWING SHARE OF IMMIGRANTS CHOOS-
ING NATURALIZATION 14 (2007), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/74.pdf.
10. Id. at6.
11. Irene Bloemraad, Citizenship Lessons from the Past: The Contours of Immigrant Natu-
ralization in the Early 20th Century, 87 Soc. Sci. Q. 927, 929-30 (2006).
[Vol. 107:931
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1920.12 After several decades of sharp restrictions on immigration, with as-
similation of long-term immigrants, that percentage moved to a high of 79%
in 1950. Increasing immigration after that pushed the number back down;
just after the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986" added millions
of newly legalized immigrants, the percentage of the legal foreign-born
population who were citizens dropped to a low of 38%. It has been rising
since then.'
4
If we want to learn about immigrants' propensity to naturalize over time,
thus, it's unhelpful to measure the fraction of the total immigrant population
who have naturalized at any given point; we do better to look at the percent-
age of an immigrant cohort who become citizens within a set number of
years. 5 That analysis reveals a marked increase in immigrants' desire to
naturalize today in comparison with other points in our history. 6 In 1920,
toward the end of an immigration wave comparable in size to today's, only
31% of men who had arrived ten to fourteen years before had become citi-
zens.' 7 Twenty-five years ago, in 1983, a comparable 30% of those who had
entered ten years earlier had naturalized. 8 But in 2005, fully 50% of those
who had arrived ten years earlier had become citizens. '9 A careful recent
study similarly concludes that the tendency to naturalize increased signifi-
cantly between 1995 and 2005.' 0 Lawful permanent residents are becoming
citizens sooner, and at a higher rate.2' "[I]t is clear that today's legal immi-
grants are signing on to a closer relationship with the U.S. than was the case
,,22a decade or two ago.
One can ask some serious questions about why U.S. naturalization rates
are not higher than they are-and why the rates for Mexicans in particular
12. PASSEL, supra note 9, at 6; see also Nancy Foner, Engagements Across National Borders,
Then and Now, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2483, 2486 (2007).
13. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
14. PASSEL, supra note 9, at 6.
15. See DEREKH D. F. CORNWELL, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATURALIZATION RATE
ESTIMATES: STOCK VS. FLOW 1 (2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assetslstatistics
publications/ois naturalizationsjfs 2004.pdf.
16. It also reveals a large differential based on regions of origin. Approximately 70% of all
eligible immigrants from Europe and Asia currently living in the United States are citizens, while
only 35% of those from Mexico are. See PASSEL, supra note 9, at 14-15.
17. See Bloemraad, supra note 11, at 930 tbl.1.
18. See BRYAN C. BAKER, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., TRENDS IN NATURALIZATION
RATES 1 (2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ntz-
rates508.pdf.
19. Id. at I fig.1.
20. PASSEL, supra note 9, at 17.
21. Id. at ii. In particular, the naturalization rate for Mexican immigrants is increasing sharp-
ly, essentially doubling from 1995 to 2005. See id. at 18.
22. Id. at ii.
April 2009]
Michigan Law Review
have been low." The data, though, contradict any story that in the wake of
globalization, immigrants have been spuming naturalization in ever-
increasing numbers. Quite the contrary: the modern trend, for the last couple
of decades at least, has been for immigrants to naturalize more quickly and
in greater numbers than they did before.
B. The Benefits of Citizenship
Nor should it be surprising that substantial numbers of immigrants want
to become citizens: ask a typical immigration lawyer, and she will tell you
that naturalization carries with it important legal advantages. Most obvious
is security from deportation. A lawful permanent resident can be deported
because of a belated discovery that she was technically inadmissible or ad-
mitted in the wrong preference category, when she first entered the
country;14 because she committed any of a broad range of crimes, many of
them not especially serious;25 because she "endorse[d] ... terrorist activity"
or contributed money to an organization deemed to be supporting such ac-
tivity;26 or on a variety of other grounds. Citizens are immune from all this.
There are other immigration-law advantages to citizenship. Being a citi-
zen is tremendously valuable if you want your relatives to be able to enter
the country legally by virtue of their relationship with you. A U.S. citizen
who marries, say, a Mexican citizen, and seeks an immigrant visa for his
spouse, is entitled to one as soon as the Department of Homeland Security
("DHS") completes its investigation and paperwork. On the other hand, a
lawful permanent resident who marries a Mexican citizen and seeks an im-
migrant visa for his spouse gets the privilege of standing at the back of a
queue; as of this writing, applicants who sought their visas in May 2002
27were still waiting in line. Precisely the same disparity applies to citizens
and noncitizens seeking visas for the admission of their unmarried minor
children.
There is also the matter of public benefits: while means-tested govern-
ment benefits other than Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") are
generally available to permanent residents who have lived here for more
than five years, they are limited by the "deeming" rule. U.S. law requires
anyone seeking to immigrate on the basis of his family relationship to a U.S.
citizen or permanent resident to secure an "affidavit of support" from his
sponsor, in which the sponsor promises to support the alien financially (at
23. See supra notes 16, 21 and accompanying text. For useful research, see SUSAN
GONZALEZ-BAKER ET AL., TOMAS RIVERA POLICY INST., THE MAKING OF AMERICANS: RESULTS
OF THE TEXAS NATURALIZATION SURVEY (2000).
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) (2006); see, e.g., Preston, supra note 5.
25. 8 U.S.C. §§ I 101(a)(43), 1227(a)(2); see, e.g., Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727 (7th
Cir. 2001) (alien who had lived in the United States since he was an infant removed because, at age
nineteen, he had had consensual sex with his fifteen-year-old girlfriend).
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(Vll); accord §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), 1227(a)(4)(B).
27. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, VISA BULLETIN FOR DECEMBER 2008, http://travel.state.gov/visa/
frvi/bulletin/bulletin_4384.html.
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125% of the poverty level) until the alien becomes a citizen, works forty
Social Security quarters (ten years of continuous employment), or dies.
Unless he naturalizes, the alien will generally be ineligible for federal
means-tested benefits during that ten-years-plus period, because his spon-
sor's income and resources are deemed to be available to him in computing
his eligibility for the benefits.
At the same time, it's not clear that any of these are the concerns that ac-
tually motivate immigrants to become citizens. According to one study, a
key theme in some immigrants' thinking about citizenship is the fear that
"the status of legal permanent resident is now insecure and that U.S. citizen-
ship is necessary to recapture the rights they had as legal permanent
residents., 29 In another study, the top three reasons would-be citizens gave,
in anonymous surveys, as to why they were seeking citizenship were "I want
to vote" (86%); "I plan to live in the United States for the rest of my life"
(83.9%); and "I love the United States" (73.6%). Only about 44% offered "I
want to help my relatives come to the United States," and only about 27% "1
am afraid I will lose government services.
C. Everything Old Is New Again
Spiro is correct that, in a broad variety of ways, we do not treat lawful
permanent residents much differently from citizens. Many aliens can receive
a range of government benefits. They can participate in public discourse
even without voting. All this may contribute to the fact that many permanent
residents take a long time to naturalize. Some, as Spiro explains, "don't oth-
erwise identify with the American community," and naturalization isn't
"worth compromising their identity" (p. 81). For others, the "bureaucratic
hassle" outweighs the benefits (p. 81).
That naturalization has advantages and disadvantages, though, is hardly
new. Consider the situation in 1920. Citizenship had a different set of advan-
tages and disadvantages. Some states allowed many noncitizens to vote.
Immunity from deportation was less of an issue because the grounds for
32
deportation were less extensive. Preference for entering relatives was not
28. See 8 U.S.C. § 1631. The statute provides an exception where applying the deeming rule
would leave an alien "unable to obtain food and shelter." § 1631 (e)(2). While some states provide
state-funded benefits to immigrants ineligible for federal ones, the vast majority of states still take
"deeming" into account before providing benefits other than health insurance. See National Center
for Children in Poverty, 50-State Data, http://www.nccp.org/tools/table.php?states=&ids=20-478,23-
478,24-478,24-479,12-478&db=pol&data=text#2 (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
29. Audrey Singer & Greta Gilbertson, Naturalization in the Wake of Anti-Immigrant Legis-
lation: Dominicans in New York City 9 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Working Paper No.
10, 2000), available at http://www.camegieendowment.org/files/dominican.pdf.
30. See GONZALEZ-BAKER ET AL., supra note 23, at 8 tbl.5.
31. See Bloemraad, supra note 11, at 946.
32. Few people were deported before 1920. MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECrS: ILLEGAL
ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 59 (2004). Congress substantially expanded the
bases for deportation with the Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889-90 (provid-
ing, among other things, that an immigrant could be deported if he or she committed a crime
April 2009]
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an issue at all because we had no immigration restrictions in place to which
such preferences would be relevant. And there was no social safety net from
which immigrants could be excluded. On the other hand, some states had
rules in place excluding noncitizens from certain occupations and restricting
noncitizens from owning large amounts of land.33 Some immigrants then
were reluctant to naturalize because of their ties to their home countries,
34
and others were deterred by bureaucratic barriers;" the same is true now.
Given enough time, the vast majority did naturalize then; the same is true36
now. Indeed, immigrants now are naturalizing more quickly than they did
then.37
II. WHO CAN BECOME A CITIZEN?
Spiro devotes much of his book to charting the rules governing who is
granted the status of U.S. citizen at birth, and who can claim that status
through naturalization. Those rules, he urges, fit badly with our larger goals
as to who ought to be a citizen. They include some people without meaning-
ful ties to the United States ("happenstance Americans"), and exclude some
whose ties are as strong as those of us inside the citizenship fence. Because
the legal and the actual boundaries of our national community do not coin-
cide, Spiro tells us, that community is becoming increasingly incoherent
(pp. 30-32). But in an age of globalization, he continues, that incoherence is
unavoidable.
A. Framing the Problem
Spiro begins by explaining the bedrockjus soli rule of U.S. citizenship:
anyone born within the territorial confines of the United States is automati-
cally a U.S. citizen. This rule has deep roots in the English common law and
was written into the U.S. Constitution (after being rejected in the Dred Scott
case)" via the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is suffi-
involving moral turpitude within five years after entry, or committed two such crimes at any time
before gaining citizenship). Congress expanded deportation further with the Act of 1924. Immigra-
tion Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 14, 43 Stat. 153, 162. Deportation, as a result, "came of age" in the
1920s. NGAI, supra, at 58-60.
33. Bloemraad, supra note 11, at 942-45.
34. See Nancy Foner, Immigrant Commitment to America, Then and Now: Myths and Reali-
ties, 5 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 27, 28 (2001) (noting Thomas Archdeacon's suggestion that some pre-
WWI immigrants failed to naturalize " 'because they viewed themselves as transients in the United
States' "(quoting THOMAS ARCHDEACON, BECOMING AMERICAN 157 (1983))).
35. See Bloemraad, supra note I1, at 931-32, 941-42.
36. Compare id. at 930 (noting that in 1920, 80% of immigrants who had lived here twenty
or more years had naturalized), with PASSEL, supra note 9, at 28 (noting that as of 2005, 75% of
immigrants in the United States who have lived here twenty or more years have naturalized, includ-
ing almost 90% of those from Asia and North Africa, and 80% of those from Europe, Canada, sub-
Saharan Africa, and South America).
37. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
38. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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ciently entrenched as a constitutional and policy norm in this country, Spiro
explains, that no attempt to change it could succeed (Chapter One).
Though jus soli has substantial merits, Spiro argues, it means that an in-
creasing number of people are born Americans who lack future attachment
to America. "Two facets of globalization are at work here: increased mobil-
ity and the maturation of sustainable transnational networks" (p. 20). A child
may be born in this country to a visitor, or to an immigrant (legal or illegal)
who is here temporarily; that child may move away quickly, following his
parents to the country of their birth. Such a person, Spiro warns, is a U.S.
citizen but only by happenstance- she has almost no meaningful connec-
tion with the United States (pp. 20-22).
Moreover, Spiro warns, children born in the United States to parents
who are part of "diasporic communities"-emigrant communities maintain-
ing strong ties with homelands in such countries as Mexico, Korea, India,
China, the Philippines, Cuba, El Salvador, Colombia, and Haiti-pose a
challenge to traditional citizenship rules (pp. 22-25). Globalization has em-
powered immigrants to the United States to maintain ties with their home
countries; thus, a New York Times article in 1998 reported that as many as
10,000 American students with family ties to the Dominican Republic were
attending high schools there so as to avoid the drugs, guns, and other dan-
gers of American urban life (p. 23 n.32). The mere fact that these children
are born and raised in the United States, Spiro explains, "may not be predic-
tive of later community attachment.... Those who do remain in the United
States may pursue their whole lives within their diasporic communities, de-
fined not by geography but by social ties, even if they episodically venture
into the larger national community otherwise defined" (p. 23). The jus soli
rule makes those children citizens, but they may share little other than birth-
place with the rest of us.39 A "respectable abstract argument" (p. 23) could
be made that they should not be citizens.
Spiro sees a similar disconnect in the rules for awarding citizenship by
naturalization. The main criterion for naturalization is five years spent living
in the United States after admission for permanent residence (three years if
spent in marital union with a citizen spouse). In the past, he states, this made
sense; as a general matter, we expected people who had lived here for five
years to have absorbed the American identity through the activities and ex-
posures of everyday life (p. 38). Today, on the other hand, that's less true:
Immigrants can lead their entire lives in "larger, geographically concentrated
immigrant communities .... Such immigrants might as well be back home
for purposes of assimilating the American identity. They are, in effect, in a
different part of their homeland, one that happens to be physically located in
the United States" (p. 39). The requirements for citizenship, Spiro argues,
no longer give us any particular reason to believe that naturalized citizens
39. Much the same is true, Spiro urges, of the rules for awarding citizenship to children born
abroad to U.S. parents. A person born outside the United States to American parents, who lives his
entire life outside this country except for a few years as a college student and young professional,
can nonetheless transmit his U.S. citizenship to a child. Thus, "United States passports will come to
be held by another growing group of individuals who are effectively foreigners." P. 27.
April 20091
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are meaningfully members of the American community, or indeed plan to
stay here for the long haul.
This country does have civics and language requirements for naturaliza-
tion. Applicants for citizenship must demonstrate "understanding of the
fundamentals of the history, and of the principles and form of government,
of the United States," and they must be able to read, write, and speak the
40English language. Spiro answers that in practice these requirements are not
onerous and that it would not work to try and make them so. The world has
become Americanized: most of the globe already is familiar with our social
ways, our culture, and our style of democracy. Much of the world speaks
English. It will not work to treat familiarity with American politics, Ameri-
can civic culture, or the English language as the dividing line separating
those inside our community from those without.
4'
All of this is important, Spiro urges, because it leaves us with no basis
for a conception of American citizenship. To the extent citizenship lines are
disconnected from real communal bonds, we as a nation will not treat them
as meaningful. We will not sacrifice on behalf of our fellow citizens absent
some emotional connection to them. "I will not fight for someone who
shares membership merely because his parents were passing through when
he was born, nor will I be inclined to share my paycheck with him" (p. 31).
I'm skeptical, though. Any legal enactment will betray some lack of fit
with its underlying goals. In the jurisprudential lexicon, legal statements can
be characterized as falling somewhere on the continuum between rules
(sharp edged and black letter, making legal consequences turn on a small
number of easily characterized inputs) and standards (ad hoc and situation-
ally sensitive, making legal consequences turn on the overall balancing of
any seemingly relevant consideration). That it's illegal to drive more than
fifty-five miles per hour on a given road is a rule; that one can face liability
for driving faster than would a hypothetical reasonable person, given all the
circumstances, is a standard. The classic advantage of rules lies in their pre-
dictability and ease of application; rules avoid the arbitrariness that can
result when decision makers have too much discretion. But rules foreclose
potentially relevant factors from the decision maker's consideration, and so
their application in particular cases may disserve the legislature's underlying
goals. Indeed, so may any legal enactment that tells the decision maker any-
thing other than "consider all of the facts, and then take whatever step it is
that, on balance, best serves the legislature's ultimate goals and values."
There is good reason to want our criteria for citizenship to be rule bound
rather than standards based. It is disturbing to imagine a judge having exten-
sive, ad hoc discretion over whether an applicant for citizenship will be
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1423(a)(1)-(2) (2006).
41. Indeed, Spiro urges that our rles for citizenship are underinclusive as well as overinclu-
sive. There are people who fall outside the boundaries of citizenship, he argues, who are nonetheless
effectively members of our national community; U.S. policymaking interests and affects them. They
include residents of communities straddling the U.S.-Mexican border, as well as communities in
such countries as El Salvador and the Dominican Republic with close ties to relatives and commu-
nity members who have migrated to the United States.
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deemed worthy, in part because the judge might use that discretion to privi-
lege some applicants (say, white wealthy ones) over others (say, poorer
brown ones). Certainly immigration decision makers in the past used admin-
42istrative discretion to effect racially based exclusions. But the consequence
of relying more heavily on rules to make citizenship determinations is that
some people will fit the rules' criteria who, perhaps, should not really be
citizens, and some people may fall outside of those criteria even though,
perhaps, they really should. That's just the way law works.
So we need to focus on two questions. First, is the fit between our citi-
zenship rules and their underlying goals that much worse than in the past?
And second, if so, how much of a problem is that?
B. Past and Present
As for the first question, the factors that Spiro identifies as leading to
"happenstance" or uncommitted Americans did not just arise in the last few
years. Spiro mentions circular migration (the phenomenon of immigrants
moving to this country and then returning to their homelands) as a source of
happenstance Americans, since a migrant might have an American child
during the brief U.S. portion of her sojourn and then raise the child else-
where (p. 19-22). But circular migration has long been with us; Spiro notes
estimates that in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, more than half
of all immigrants to the United States from southern Italy ended up return-
ing home, at least for a time. Indeed, according to one source, the proportion
of immigrants returning to their homelands in 1900-1920 was one-and-a-
half times as high as the rate in 197 1-90.
4
1
More fundamentally, transnationalism-the phenomenon of immigrants
maintaining active involvement in, and ties to, their homelands-is not a
new thing. 4 Immigrants formed diasporic communities at the turn of the last
century.45 Consider the following sentiment: "The conception of citizenship
itself is rapidly changing .... The old barriers are everywhere breaking
down. We may even bring ourselves to the point of recognizing foreign 'co-
lonies' in our midst, on our own soil, as entitled to partake in the
parliamentary life of their mother country.' 46 The passage is nicely comple-
mentary to Spiro's concern that, by virtue of the ease of international travel
and communication, insular "colonies" of migrants may be so strongly tied
to their homelands as to lack primary identification with the United States.
42. NGAI, supra note 32, at 56-90.
43. NANCY FONER, IN A NEW LAND: A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF IMMIGRATION 65 (2005).
44. See Foner, supra note 12, at 2483-84; Alejandro Portes, Conclusion: Theoretical Con-
vergencies and Empirical Evidence in the Study of Immigrant Transnationalism, 37 INT'L
MIGRATION REV. 874, 875 (2003).
45. See FONER, supra note 43, at 67-69.
46. Id. at 62.
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Gino Speranza, secretary of the Society for the Protection of Italian Immi-
grants, wrote those words in 1906.4
Concerns about aliens forming insular, self-isolating communities
within the United States are surely not new. As far back as 1889, Justice
Field described Chinese immigrants as having "remained strangers in the
land, residing apart by themselves, and adhering to the customs and usages
of their own country,' 48 unwilling or unable "to assimilate with our people or
to make any change in their habits or modes of living. '49 The Supreme Court
justified World War II-era Japanese internment in part by pointing to
Japanese-Americans' asserted inability to "assimilat[e] as an integral part of
the white population."5" Many were more sanguine about European
assimilation. Nonetheless, when in the 1920s Congress enacted legislation
sharply restricting immigration by southern and eastern Europeans, it was
prompted in part by calls that the melting pot was failing to break down
pockets of insularity among those immigrants.5 A 1924 newspaper editorial,
for example, explained that restricting immigration was desirable precisely
because it would "result in the gradual elimination of foreign communities
on American soil. There will be no more 'little Germany,' 'little Russia,'
'little Poland' or 'little Italy.' ,52
In retrospect, those fears about immigrant acculturation were meritless.
Immigrants to the United States abandoned their mother languages and
shifted to (English) monolingualism more quickly than in any other coun-
try. 3 To the extent that the members of the great early-twentieth century
wave of immigration did not assimilate, their children and grandchildren
certainly did.54 Is there reason to think that contemporary concerns are better
founded? Modem advances in communication and travel have made trans-
national ties easier in ways that were unthinkable a hundred years ago. But
the data do not support the notion that the affiliations and acculturation of
children born into immigrant communities are very different now.
Consider language acquisition. Spiro suggests that language acquisition
means less in the modem world, when so many immigrants already speak
English, than it did a hundred years ago. But many immigrants today enter
without language skills; in the 2000 census, two-thirds of recent immigrants
47. Id.
48. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 595
(1889).
49. Id.
50. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 96 (1943).
51. The phrase encapsulating this fear was "alien indigestion." ROBERT A. DIVINE, AMERI-
CAN IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1924-1952, at 7 (1957); JOSEPH NEVINS, OPERATION GATEKEEPER: THE
RISE OF THE "ILLEGAL ALIEN" AND THE MAKING OF THE U.S.-MExIco BOUNDARY 101-02 (2002).
52. NEVINS, supra note 51, at 224 n.52 (quoting a May 14, 1924 Los Angeles limes edito-
rial).
53. See ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBIN RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA: A PORTRAIT 183
(1990).
54. See FONER, supra note 43, at 79-80; PORTES & RUMBAUT, supra note 53.
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from Latin America reported that they spoke English "not well at all" or
"not well."55 Where the parent does not speak English, the child's acquisition
of English both evidences and makes possible her integration into the larger
society. Studies consistently show language acquisition in the second and
third generations of modem immigrants to be comparable with that in ear-
56lier waves.
Alternatively, consider intermarriage. Census information, so far at least,
belies the notion that Asian and Latin American immigrants find themselves
in imperviously sealed communities that maintain their insularity across
multiple generations; 1990 data show nearly two-thirds of U.S.-bom Asians
marrying non-Asians, and nearly forty percent of U.S.-born Hispanics mar-
rying non-Hispanics."
To be sure, immigrants today often live in coethnic enclaves, just as im-
migrants in the past did.58 But a "review of the social science research
literature on immigration reveals that assimilation ... appears to be progress-
ing roughly as it always has."59 For "the great majority of the new second
generation... let alone a third generation still in gestation, what the empirical
tea leaves seem to suggest (in English) is that theirs is an American future, not
a bilingual or binational one."6
C. Citizenship and Community
Even if one accepts Spiro's argument that the match between citizenship
rules and affective community is getting weaker, there is still reason to be
skeptical of his thesis that, by virtue of that poor fit, we care for each other
less and are less willing to sacrifice for one another. The argument makes
theoretical sense. Given the fact that fellow citizens may well not have
meaningful ties to the American enterprise, why should we feel strong ties
to them? But laid up against the larger American narrative, the argument
seems to miss the point.
55. See FRANK D. BEAN & GILLIAN STEVENS, AMERICA'S NEWCOMERS AND THE DYNAMICS
OF DIVERSITY 156 (2003).
56. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, National Identity in a Multicultural Na-
tion: The Challenge of Immigration Law and Immigrants, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1347, 1379-80 (2005)
(reviewing SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA'S NATIONAL
IDENTITY (2004)); Ruben G. Rumbaut, Severed or Sustained Attachments? Language, Identity, and
Imagined Communities in the Post-Immigrant Generation, in THE CHANGING FACE OF HOME: THE
TRANSNATIONAL LIVES OF THE SECOND GENERATION 43, 67-71 (Peggy Levitt & Mary C. Waters
eds., 2002) (discussing language acquisition in modem immigrants).
57. FONER, supra note 43, at 38.
58. See, e.g., NATHAN GLAZER & DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTING
POT: THE NEGROES, PUERTO RICANS, JEWS, ITALIANS, AND IRISH OF NEW YORK CITY (2d ed. 1970).
59. T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Ruben Rumbaut, Terms of Belonging: Are Models of Member-
ship Self-Fulfilling Prophecies?, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 10 (1998).
60. Rumbaut, supra note 56, at 90. But see FONER, supra note 43, at 83 ("The verdict is not




Spiro suggests that the "bond of American citizenship" was probably
stronger through the mid-nineteenth century, because of the homogeneity
and shared backgrounds of the (propertied, white, and male) individuals
with full participation rights in the new polity (p. 111). But if there ever
were in the early nineteenth century a golden age of American fellow feel-
ing and common purpose (and historians have argued powerfully that there
was not, that Americans were deeply divided by the market revolution 6' and
the Jacksonian movement62 ), we were not sundered by the expansion of
American citizenship and the franchise. We were sundered by our divisions
over slavery and race. It is racial hostility, not the inefficiencies of citizen-
ship rules, that has stood as a prime obstacle to expanding programs for the
redistribution of wealth in this country.63 And while the current debates over
immigration have engendered much controversy, it is hard to escape the
conclusion that it is race-not concerns about whether white immigrants
will be part of our affective community-that is the prime mover there too.
It has often been the case over the course of this country's history that
refusal to extend the bonds of community has been directed at immigrants,
new citizens, or soon-to-be citizens. But it has not been motivated by ab-
stract concerns that our citizenship rules might bring into our political
community people insufficiently connected to the United States; it has been
motivated by beliefs that immigration by folks of particular races, ethnici-
ties, or cultures would damage the nation. In the nineteenth century, we saw
fears of the "'unsavory and repellant,'" mentally inferior throng then enter-
ing from southern and eastern Europe; 64 today we see Samuel Huntington's
urgent call that what is damaging American society today is its increasing
61inclusion of people from Mexico. It is hard to be too concerned about the
possibility that even if America were somehow entirely cleansed of racial
and ethnic animosities, we might still suffer from a lack of fellow feeling
because a few new citizens were insufficiently connected to the United
States.
III. THE CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP
In the final chapters of his book, Spiro urges that the concept of Ameri-
can citizenship, in a globalizing world, is ultimately incoherent. He lays out
basic contradictions in our thinking that relate to admitting outsiders to citi-
61. See CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA, 1815-1846
(1991).
62. See DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICA, 1815-1848 (2007).
63. See Keith Banting & Will Kymlicka, Inimduction, in MULTICULTURALISM AND THE
WELFARE STATE: RECOGNITION AND REDISTRIBUTION IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES 25-26
(Keith Banting & Will Kymlicka eds., 2006).
64. JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-
1925, at 63 (2d ed. 2002) (quoting an 1888 Philadelphia Press comment).
65. See SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA'S NATIONAL
IDENTITY 221-56 (2004).
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zenship. Spiro's challenge is powerful, but in my view falls short. The con-
tradictions he emphasizes are not really new, and are not intractable.
A. Challenging the Philosophical Coherence of Citizenship
How, Spiro asks, can the institution of citizenship embody American
identity? It is too late, he writes, to center American identity on whiteness
and a specific ethnic core; history and the pressures of immigration have
passed that nativist vision by (pp. 110-12). Nor, he continues, will it work to
follow a conservative, nationalist vision in which all immigrants must
"Americanize" by adopting the English language, the American way of life,
and American ideals. While some would have would-be citizens pass a
tougher citizenship test to show their understanding of American history and
politics, few of the native born could pass such a test, and devoting more
resources to gauging the Americanization bona fides of would-be citizens
would strain DHS beyond the breaking point (pp. 112-15).
More to the point, Spiro adds, there is no core of American identity be-
yond the popular culture (Snoop Dogg, anyone?) that we share with the
world (p. 115). There was a time, he explains, when it was meaningful to
ask new immigrants to Americanize. American beliefs and values-
including a commitment to democratic governance-were distinctive. But
today those values are near-universal; their success is "both America's tri-
umph and its decline" (p. 52).
Spiro is surely correct that nobody today could credibly seek to impose
on immigrants the harsh "Americanization" programs of the 1920s. Not for
us is the pageant staged at Henry Ford's English School, where a long line
of students dressed in individual and outlandish native costumes marched
into a giant "melting pot" as another stream of students emerged, all wear-
ing identical suits and carrying American flags.66 But Spiro's denial that
there exists any such thing as American identity suggests an odd tension at
the heart of his argument. In this age of globalization, Spiro insists, the
knowledge base that once defined the American community has become the
property of much of the world. If one really believes this, though, then what
exactly is the problem posed by the "happenstance American" born in the
United States but who spends much of her life outside it? With the child
growing up in a "diasporic community" said to be socially and culturally
disconnected from the larger nation? It seems that even Spiro believes that a
sufficient period of acculturation and residence, meaningfully situated with-
in the American community, does convey something-knowledge, values,
more-that makes you American. That something is American identity.
It may be that Spiro is saying that the problem with those citizens is not
that they lack American values or knowledge, but rather that they may lack
attachment-that they may not be committed to making a life within the
American community. To that extent, he situates himself within the project
he critiques as liberal nationalism. Liberal nationalists see American identity
66. See HIGHAM, supra note 64, at 247-48.
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as resting in its politics: the nation is "'united in patriotic attachment to a
shared set of political practices and values.'" (p. 116; quoting Michael
Ignatieff). Under the liberal conception, "the individual's will to belong and
to maintain the [American] civic faith" is what America is about (p. 118).
But Spiro goes on to argue that liberal nationalism too is flawed. The
problem, he explains, is that the institution of citizenship is exclusive; its
essence is closure. The state presents itself as expressing the will and fur-
thering the interests of a particular, bounded citizenry-and no nation can be
bounded unless its rules exclude outsiders while including insiders. 6' After
all, a group's ability "to demand singular membership, to set the terms of
admission ... may be necessary to maintaining community cohesion and
identity" (p. 156). If America conferred a universal right to citizenship, it
would "not be much of a nation" (p. 119).
At the same time, Spiro continues, liberal thought's universalist prem-
ises demand that citizenship be "an inclusive institution, available to all
wishing to subscribe., 68 Here is where liberalism finds itself in a bind: on
what basis can a person seeking citizenship be excluded? Liberal thought,
Spiro urges, cannot justify any meaningful condition on membership for
those professing belief in the constitutional system. Indeed, it is hard-
pressed to justify even a rule requiring that aspirants to U.S. citizenship be
territorially present: Cannot people in other countries be just as committed
to democracy, the rule of law, and American civic nationalism as anyone
else? Might they not be just as invested in U.S. government decision mak-
ing?
Moreover, Spiro argues, in a world of plural nationality and transna-
tional connections, we need no longer see the state as the primary guarantor
of rights (Chapter Six). Civil society exists on a transnational basis; its ac-
tors are not confined within national boundaries. The international law
regime incorporates human rights protections. The security threat in the
modem world, Spiro urges, comes from terrorism, not from nation-states;
local law enforcement and private actors, not just the nation-state, partici-
pate in the provision of defense and security against that threat (pp. 139-
40). Non-state institutions such as churches and corporate entities are gain-
ing in importance (pp. 140-44).
B. Critiquing the Critique
I'm less than fully convinced by Spiro's account of the rise of non-state
organizations in the modern world. International law and civil society or-
ganizations don't play a meaningfully greater role in protecting rights in the
United States today than they did in the past. Certainly, many non-state or-
ganizations play roles in our lives; some of them regulate conduct or
67. Pp. 115-35; see also ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE
AND GERMANY 21-34 (1992).
68. P. 116. See generally LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF
CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP (2006).
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redistribute wealth. But as Spiro recognizes, that's not new. Spiro urges that
non-state organizations are saliently different today because so many of
them are transnational and thus transcend the state (pp. 125-26). But I'm
doubtful how much the transnational nature of (some of) today's non-state
organizations affects everyday lives. And can one seriously argue that the
role of the nation-state as provider of national security and defense is dissi-
pating in the age of terrorism? Notwithstanding the peculiarities of U.S.
federalism, it's unconvincing to classify local law enforcement as a non-
state actor.
I'm also unconvinced that imposing immigration controls and arbitrary
restrictions on citizenship is a necessary component of national identity.
Spiro notes Michael Walzer's defense of such restrictions on the ground that
they are necessary to the maintenance of "communities of character" (pp.
156-57): "historically stable, ongoing associations of men and women with
some special commitment to one another and some special sense of their
,,69common life. Yet certainly there are many churches and religious organi-
zations today, for example, that have no barriers to membership and yet
succeed at maintaining identity, community, and fellowship. American iden-
tity was powerful through the 1880s, when this nation was open to the
immigration and eventual citizenship of the vast majority of those who
wanted to enter;70 it was powerful through the 1920s, when we remained
open to the immigration and eventual citizenship of the vast majority of
those who weren't Asian.7' American identity was powerful, Spiro reminds
us, in part because America's constitutional democracy was distinctive-and
given that fact, we did just fine with no more than minimal restrictions on
entry and citizenship.
To help draw the connection between citizenship barriers and national
identity, Spiro calls the reader's attention to the Supreme Court's 1972 deci-
sion in Dunn v. Blumstein, in which the Court held that a state could not
condition voting in state and local elections on a person's having lived in the
72state for more than thirty days. Blumstein instantiates a thin citizenship
regime for membership in state political communities: the United States
requires that an immigrant live here for at least five years before he can gain
the right to vote in U.S. elections, but the states are forbidden to impose
comparable requirements. Spiro insightfully observes that "thin citizenship
regimes correspond to thin identity constructs" (p. 54). It's not coincidental,
in other words, that folks in this country for the most part don't identify
69. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 62
(1983).
70. This country had immigration restrictions even before 1882, see Gerald L. Neuman, The
Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993), but they
were minor compared to what followed.
71. For a good account of the "Chinese exclusion laws" enacted beginning in 1882 (nomi-
nally repealed in 1943, though not fully repealed until 1965), see Lucy E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS
TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW (1995).
72. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
April 20091
Michigan Law Review
themselves with their states and don't feel special bonds of loyalty to others
in their particular states.
Spiro sees in Blumstein a lesson that the "relatively low existing thresh-
old for naturalization both reflects and contributes to a diminishing sense of
national identity" (p. 56). I see a different lesson in Blumstein and the con-
tinuing importance of the five years' residency requirement as an ingredient
of U.S. citizenship. The Court in Blumstein conveyed the message that the
nation-the United States-is the unit within which we are to feel bonds of
loyalty and community. The nation is crucial; state boundaries are just lines
on a map.
It's because we in the United States take seriously the notion that this
nation is, meaningfully, an affective community (as the states are not) that
we impose a set of naturalization requirements directed toward assuring
ourselves that the prospective citizen is somebody to whom the rest of us
can feel organically connected, to whom we can feel a bond of loyalty. How
do we do that? Precisely through a durational residency requirement: Before
we get married, we live together. Before we welcome someone new into our
community, we require a probationary period so as to get to know them. The
durational residency requirement is there to reassure those of us who already
have citizenship that prospective citizens have been around long enough for
us to trust them. On that level, we restrict membership in our club, if only
because we can: because it is our club, and our affective community, and
restricting membership is one of the things that members of clubs do.
The biggest restriction on U.S. citizenship, of course, is not the five-year
requirement as such: it is the rule that before the five-year clock can start
running, you must first be admitted for permanent residence, together with
immigration controls that ensure that the vast majority of people seeking
entry into this country never will be so admitted. That returns us to Spiro's
twin challenges to liberal nationalism. First, are these restrictions on U.S.
citizenship consistent with the nature of liberal thought? Is it morally justifi-
able that mere accident of birth should determine who can be a U.S. citizen,
with all that comes with it (most importantly, the right to live and work in
the United States), and who cannot be? Second, with or without these re-
strictions, is there anything left of American identity?
It's worth noting that the challenge Spiro identifies liberal nationalism as
posing to immigration controls and citizenship restrictions has nothing to do
with globalization. The contradictions he discusses go back to our exclusion
of Asians from immigration starting in the 1880s and our near-exclusion of
southern and eastern Europeans starting in the 1920s. That was when we
first faced the question whether, if the American community was defined by
its commitment to American values, we could justify denying admission to
people who wanted to enter this country and commit themselves to those
values. Our answers were rooted in the concerns of a California state senate
committee that the Chinese, "inferior to any race God ever made," had "no
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souls to save, and if they have, they are not worth saving" ;73 the charge of a
prominent sociologist that Italians "'lack the power to take rational care of
themselves' ,;74 the concern expressed in a report offered up by the chair of
the U.S. House Committee on Immigration that Jews were "'filthy, un-
American, and often dangerous in their habits.' ,75
We maintain numerical immigration restrictions today, though they are
no longer racially based. Do we have more legitimate justifications today? It
doesn't seem to me that we do. Here I agree with Spiro: Liberal thinking
does-properly--condemn our exclusion of outsiders based merely on acci-
dent of birth. That condenmation is heightened by the fact that nearly all of
us in white America are the beneficiaries of our country's prior open door.
To exclude those born elsewhere, we need to argue that they are less worthy,
less deserving, than our own grandparents and great-grandparents, who were
offered admission without conditions. We can't do So.76
I would open American borders broadly to people who want to immi-
grate here and become part of the American experiment. Without sweeping
restrictions on entry, we would lose today's most important practical restric-
tion on citizenship. Where would that leave American identity? Spiro urges
that absent meaningful American identity in an age of globalization, and
absent coherent justification for immigration controls and citizenship re-
strictions, we face "the end of the self-contained nation" (p. 123). But it
seems to me that American identity is not so devalued. The elements of the
American creed include, notably enough, a commitment to immigration and
to the experiment-an enterprise of perpetually rebuilding and reconstructing
our City upon a Hill,77 a city that we collectively built, rather than merely in-
herited, and that therefore we can rebuild-that we in the United States still
see as distinctively American. There are more democracies in the world today
than there were a hundred years ago, but we still see our own experiment as,
in Abraham Lincoln's words, "the last best hope of earth. '"78 Even without ar-
bitrary restrictions on immigration, devotion to that American ideal and the
American experiment still works as a principle of identity. It'll do.
73. SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, STAFF REPORT, U.S. IMMIGRA-
TION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 180 (1981) (quoting CAL. STATE S. SPEC. COMM. ON
CHINESE IMMIGRATION, CHINESE IMMIGRATION: ITS SOCIAL, MORAL AND POLITICAL EFFECTS
(1876)).
74. Id. at 178.
75. HIGHAM, supra note 64, at 309.
76. Bruce Ackerman has suggested that those born outside the nation can be excluded to
the extent that uncontrolled admission of outsiders would cause our own liberal institutions to
collapse, perhaps because "the presence of so many alien newcomers [would] generate such
anxiety ... that it [would] prove impossible to stop a fascist group from seizing political power."
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 93-95 (1980). To say the least,
that limit would permit far more immigration than we allow today.
77. The phrase is that of American settler John Winthrop. See John Winthrop, A Modell of
Christian Charity (1630), in COLLECTIONS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY, set. 3,
vol. 7, at 47 (1838).
78. Abraham Lincoln, Second Annual Message (Dec. 1, 1862), in 6 JAMES D. RICHARDSON,
A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 126, 142 (1897).
April 2009]
950 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 107:931
CONCLUSION
Beyond Citizenship is an important and thought-provoking book. Spiro
concludes that American citizenship---like citizenship generally-is doomed.
The nation-state itself will fall from its pedestal, to become just another form
of association. In the end, the book's arguments do not convince me. Whether
they convince you or not, though, anyone interested in citizenship needs to
take Spiro's book-and the future he predicts-seriously.
